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Abstract 
The recent UN IPCC special report stated that, in order to stay at or below 1.5 degrees of 
warming, greenhouse gas emissions will need to be reduced by 45 percent below 2010 levels in 
the next decade, and reach net zero emissions by 2050. These are much steeper cuts than 
previously estimated and as such, will require immediate collective action considering that 
global emissions are still rising. 
 
In February 2019, the University of Michigan announced the formation of the UM President’s 
Commission on Carbon Neutrality charged with charting a course to net zero carbon emissions. 
This report focuses on evaluating the marginal cost and abatement potential of different options 
available to the university, such as a renewable energy power purchase agreement, the Central 
Power Plant upgrade, and commoditized emissions reductions like cap-and-trade permits and 
carbon offsets. Additionally, we examine the feasibility of instituting a carbon tax on campus by 
performing a simulation on selected schools to illustrate how different tax levels and rebate 
schemes would affect each schools’ budget.  
 
Recommendations: 
● Begin Piloting a Carbon Tax: Piloting will be a necessary step ahead of implementing a 
tax university-wide. Given the time delay between piloting and implementing, the 
university should act quickly to begin piloting a carbon tax with different rebate and 
revenue schemes so as to not unnecessarily delay implementation. 
● Feedback on Revenue/Rebate Schemes: Throughout the pilot, they should collect data 
and elicit feedback from participants to determine which uses of revenue are preferred, 
how easy it is for units to estimate their yearly charges, and to what level to set the tax. 
● Central Power Plant Upgrade: The university should continue with the central power 
plant upgrade if it is a prudent financial investment. They should also adjust their 
estimated carbon abatement from the upgrade to take into account the declining carbon 
intensity of the grid, and the methane leakage that occurs from wellhead to power plant. 
● Carbon Neutrality: The university should set an ambitious carbon neutrality goal. 
Through the use carbon offsets and cap-and-trade permit retirements, there is no reason 
why the university can’t achieve carbon neutrality by 2020. In the next decade and 
beyond, cap-and-trade permits or carbon offsets can be seen not as a long-term solution, 
but as a means of closing the emissions gap to carbon neutrality, while also buying the 
university time before investing in technological solutions. 
● Technology Investments: The university should delay any further investments in 
technology upgrades until the cost curves for those upgrades meet the cost curves for 
carbon offsets and cap-and-trade permits. With solar PV, wind, and storage prices 
expected to continue dropping in the coming decades, it would be unwise to invest now 
as the university would be locked into an above market rate in just a few years’ time. 
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Background 
Global imperative to reduce emissions 
The science surrounding climate change is not up for debate. As a society, we are certain that 
emissions resulting from human activities are substantially increasing the atmospheric 
concentrations of greenhouse gasses, such as carbon dioxide, methane, CFCs, and nitrous oxides. 
Increases in the concentration of these gases leads to a warming of the Earth’s surface as more of 
the sun’s irradiance gets trapped within the atmosphere for a longer duration. While the 
concentrations might be uniformly distributed across the atmosphere, the impacts of the warming 
will be most severe in regions already under stress. 
 
Issues surrounding climate change can no longer be pushed off to future decision-makers as 
many of the natural disasters taking place today are linked to the effects of climate change. 
Extreme heat, storms, and drought as well as disease, famine and poverty will increase in 
frequency and severity as the world inches towards 2 degrees Celsius or greater of warming. In 
order to avoid the worst of those damages, dramatic steps must be undertaken now to curb global 
emissions. 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change: Working group III 
The recent UN IPCC report provides recommendations for how countries can cooperate to 
combat climate change. Due to the fact that a major proportion of emissions affecting the 
atmosphere at present came from industrialized countries, the report suggests that those countries 
bear a responsibility to cooperate with developing countries in international action against 
climate change without standing in the way of the latter’s economic development. Cooperation 
could take the form of financial aid, transfer of technology, or sharing analysis and research. The 
seriousness of climate change means that, in choosing a strategy, we should look for one that can 
be justified immediately even in the face of significant uncertainty. Among the other 
recommendations, the IPCC report suggests that governments set targets for CO2 emissions, 
improve energy efficiency measures, use cleaner energy sources, and improve forest 
management as a possible reservoir of carbon. 
 
A later report published by the same working group underscores that, in order to stay at or below 
1.5 degrees of warming, GHG emissions will need to be reduced by 45 percent below 2010 
levels in the next decade, and to reach net zero emissions by 2050.29 These are much steeper cuts 
than previously estimated and will require immediate collective action considering that current 
worldwide emissions trajectories are still rising.  
 
The rationale for and the benefits of action by UM 
‘We are still in’ pledge and Carbon Neutrality 
The message in the reports by the UN IPCC has been heard and understood around the world. 
The ‘We are still in’ pledge, which represents a commitment on the part of cities and 
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organizations to “hold warming to well below 2°C and to accelerate the transition to a clean 
energy economy that will benefit our security, prosperity, and health,” has been signed by more 
than 2,800 leaders representing cities, states, companies, and colleges from around the country, 
including the University of Michigan.11 In 2018, President Mark Schlissel went even further by 
committing the University of Michigan to a carbon neutral trajectory and launching an 
exploratory commission to develop a plan for reaching carbon neutrality. The University of 
Michigan’s commitment to carbon neutrality is a bold and necessary step at a time when 
dramatic action is needed, but it also shows recognition that going carbon neutral is both good 
for the environment as well as the university’s financial position by way of reputational gains. 
UM compared to other Institutions 
Currently, UM lags behind other top universities in the United States in their carbon reduction 
commitments such as Duke, Yale, Stanford, and MIT (for details on UM electricity consumption 
and emissions see Appendix A). While these universities are significantly smaller in terms of 
student population than UM, the University of California system, which has a student population 
similar to that of UM, has been using a carbon shadow price in their planning and has set a goal 
of being carbon neutral by 2025. Looking within the Midwest, UM is lagging behind almost all 
other Big 10 schools in terms of their current carbon abatement commitments, as six schools 
have set commitments of 100% emissions reductions by 2050.38 Given the global imperative to 
reduce emissions at a rate faster than one that would see us be carbon neutral by 2050 and UM’s 
commitment to a carbon neutral trajectory, this provides an opportunity for the self-proclaimed 
leaders and best to show leadership on yet another front and commit to full carbon reduction on a 
timeline more in-line with what is necessary to avert real climate disaster. 
Rationale for considering marginal abatement costs 
When evaluating abatement options, using marginal abatement cost (MAC) as the primary 
evaluative criterion and choosing the lowest marginal cost abatement options ($/MT of CO2) will 
minimize overall abatement costs. In their 2009 report, Pathways to a Low-Carbon Economy, 
McKinsey & Company illustrate the marginal abatement cost and overall abatement potential of 
over 200 abatement measures across 10 major sectors and 21 world regions between 2009 and 
2030.42 Their results showed that the energy savings of energy efficiency measures could largely 
pay for the upfront abatement investment costs - in many cases providing a net economic benefit 
-  giving energy efficiency a negative MAC. In other words, these measures are profitable on 
their own, independent of carbon abatement consideration. 
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The International Energy Agency’s (IEA) market reports confirm this indicating that scenarios 
with higher energy efficiency penetration show lower overall abatement costs, with an estimated  
2.8 trillion dollars in savings from 2015-2030 when comparing energy-efficiency pathways to 
energy-intensive pathways.30 In sum, the marginal costs of different abatement measures are not 
equal and energy efficiency measures are the lowest cost. Both of these studies show that there 
are a range of ongoing issues that explain why these savings haven’t yet been realized, from 
financial barriers, lack of information, and improperly aligned incentives. 
University of Michigan as a test bed for innovation 
Developing a carbon tax program at the University of Michigan would not only incentivize 
abatement in the lowest part of the marginal abatement curve, but it would also be consistent 
with UM’s values in developing leaders who challenge the present and enrich the future. 
Currently, MCity is working with transportation industry leaders to transition the way we move 
about the world to a new level of connectivity and automation. Fast Forward and the University 
Medical system is also working on groundbreaking biomedical research and innovation. The 
University of Michigan has long been a test bed for innovation, and this innovative spirit should 
be extended to our carbon management program. We have never waited to follow in the 
footsteps of who came before; instead we have been trailblazers and leaders. This should be the 
case when it comes to setting carbon abatement goals, developing strategies to meet those goals, 
and experimenting with solutions. 
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A Carbon tax would be consistent with UM values 
In a 2014 policy brief published in the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, 
Professor Frank Wolak reiterates the point that universities should be test beds for carbon tax 
programs. Seeing as how the primary role of universities is to create and disseminate knowledge, 
this lends them to be uniquely positioned to address the challenges of pricing greenhouse gases 
and working out the details before a carbon tax can be effectively implemented on the national 
scale. Wolak calls for university campuses to implement revenue-neutral carbon taxes on all 
emissions-producing activities on campus, which would result in business units and individuals 
paying extra for the activities they undertake that result, directly or indirectly, in emissions. 
 
Implementing a carbon tax at the University of Michigan, similar to the one laid out by Wolak, 
would be consistent with the mission and vision of the university in every sense. Becoming the 
first university in the Midwest, and one of the largest universities in the world, to implement a 
campus-wide carbon tax would make unequivocal UM’s position as leaders on the carbon 
abatement front and challenge the status quo for the benefit of present and future generations.  
Carbon tax as institutional innovation 
While carbon taxes are being piloted elsewhere, none are being implemented on a campus the 
size of the University of Michigan. With UM’s size, influence, and standing, implementing a 
carbon tax would be an unprecedented step in carbon management and would begin to create the 
momentum necessary to hasten society’s engagement with climate change mitigation efforts. It 
would also lead to opportunities to collaborate with peer institutions, businesses, and 
governments to discuss innovative solutions to global climate change. 
Possible Elements of a Carbon Management Program 
Cost Effectiveness as an organizing principle 
When considering ways of abating carbon emissions, there is no shortage of options. 
Technological solutions, energy efficiency investments, or carbon sequestration all having the 
ability to unlock significant abatement potential. When determining which abatement options to 
select, we propose using marginal abatement cost as the key metric to apply, shifting the 
fundamental question around abatement from ‘can we go carbon neutral’ to ‘what is the cheapest 
and fastest way to go carbon neutral’. Below we will outline some of the options currently 
available when it comes to reducing one's carbon footprint. 
Options for carbon abatement 
Technological solutions 
Technological solutions refer to uses of energy generation technologies to directly met the 
energy demand of buildings on campus. For our purposes, any technology intervention, in order 
to be seen as an abatement option, would need to emit less carbon than the energy source it is 
displacing and would need to directly serve the load generated by the university. Some examples 
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of technological solutions would be solar panels, wind turbines, geothermal plants, and biomass 
plants. The Central Power Plant (CPP) turbine upgrade, which is set to come online in 2020, 
would also be included in this category as it is displacing electricity from the DTE grid that is 
more carbon intensive. 
 
As a supply-side measure, technological solutions have the ability to unlock abatement potential 
that, otherwise, would be inaccessible to energy efficiency measures. Additionally, there are 
fewer concerns with additionality. Given that you would be the only beneficiary of the generated 
energy, you can ensure that the abatement it causes wouldn’t have occurred without your 
investment. Where the efficacy of technological solutions as abatement options comes into 
question is when considering the installation costs and the implementation time it takes to get 
them up and running. In a budget constrained world where cost effectiveness is important, 
breaking ground on a new solar array or geothermal plant might mean foregoing twice as much 
reduction from energy efficiency projects that never got funded. Additionally, it can take years to 
get projects to an operational stage, where as those same funds might be used to fund abatement 
options starting immediately. 
Energy Efficiency - Capital investments 
The Energy Efficiency 2018 Report published by the International Energy Agency estimates that 
energy efficiency gains alone could allow the world to extract twice as much economic value 
from each unit of energy used. Reports like this show why energy efficiency is one of the most 
effective ways of meeting climate goals, as these investments also often come with a positive net 
present value in addition to increasing carbon abatement. While these investments make sense on 
paper as the most prudent carbon abatement options, in reality they often run into problems that 
inevitably lead to their gains becoming unrealized. 
 
One problem is with funding. Like any collective action problem, even if the overall societal 
gains from an energy efficiency measure outweigh the costs, if there is no cost-sharing structure 
in place, the project might end up being unfunded. If each potential beneficiary evaluates their 
own net benefits as negative, were they to have to face all of the implementation costs, the 
project would never break ground. 
 
Another problem has to do with incentives. If the individuals making the momentary 
consumption decisions are not the same people who face the costs of those decisions, then there 
is no feedback mechanism for them to change their behavior or implement energy efficiency 
measures. This is commonly seen amongst renters as they do not see their electricity or heating 
bills and, therefore, don’t have any reason to want to change their consumption habits or institute 
energy efficiency upgrades in their rented homes. 
Energy Efficiency - Behavioral interventions 
The flip side of implementing energy efficient upgrades like double paned windows, CFLs, and 
insulation is that this can often lead to the rebound effect, where individuals will feel good about 
being more energy efficient, and proceed to use more energy as a result. Alongside capital 
investments, it is important to train people to engage in pro-environmental behaviors with 
behavioral interventions. Behavioral interventions refer to any measure implemented within a 
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building meant to encourage, nudge, or remind individuals to be more conscious of their 
decisions as they relate to electricity demand. Examples of this are posters placed on walls 
reminding people to be conscious of their energy decisions, or stickers on light switches which 
prime people to think about how flipping that switch will turn on a power plant. 
 
Here at the UM campus, Planet Blue regularly performs energy audits in buildings on campus 
and implements energy efficiency solutions like setting timers on lights, or reducing air 
conditioning during non-peak hours. But just as easily as these interventions are implemented, 
they can be undone as building policy is often subject to change. Additionally, the effectiveness 
of individual level behavioral interventions, like signage on energy switches or posters around 
buildings, is hard to measure and can fluctuate over time as there are so many individual 
decisions being made that will determine the outcome. 
Carbon Sequestration - Biological 
Biological carbon sequestration (BCS) refers to any biological process, performed by plants or 
micro-organisms, that sequesters carbon from the atmosphere in biomass or soil. Given that BCS 
is the environment’s way of reducing atmospheric CO2 levels, increasing BCS efforts would be 
using the environment’s own self-regulation system to self-correct. But while BCS is a 
promising avenue to increase global abatement potential, the overall capacity of terrestrial 
ecosystems to sequester carbon is uncertain. Additionally, future abatement derived from 
replanting forests would require verification, monitoring, and evaluation, to ensure accurate 
accounting year to year. Decisions to increase biological sequestration measures also come with 
stark tradeoffs, as devoting cropland to carbon sequestration could lead to a decrease in crop 
production. 
Carbon Sequestration - Industrial 
Industrial scale carbon sequestration is commonly referred to as carbon capture and storage 
(CCS), and refers to the process of capturing CO2 from large point sources, like coal plants, and 
is either injected into geological formations for long-term storage or transformed into mineral 
carbonates. When applied to a modern fossil fuel plant, CCS can reduce carbon emissions by 80-
90%.40 The IPCC estimates that CCS could account for between 10 and 55% of total carbon 
abatement by 2100.40 While costs for this technology are decreasing making it a more viable 
option, it ultimately reduces the overall efficiency of these plants, leading to more fossil fuel 
combustion than otherwise would have been necessary. Additionally, it is still a relatively new 
and unproven technology that brings with it logistical and long-run risks. 
The role of off-campus carbon abatement 
Carbon emissions do not carry with them any deleterious local effects that would preclude 
concentrating carbon emission or emissions reductions. Regardless of the geographic location of 
an emission, it will increase CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere uniformly across the entire 
world. In short, it doesn’t matter where carbon reductions occur, just that they occur. This 
principle allows us to broaden the abatement options available to the university as we can 
decouple energy generation and emissions reductions. While admittedly not ideal, continuing to 
cause emissions, whether directly through the CPP or through procuring energy from DTE, 
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becomes a viable option if we are responsible for emissions reductions elsewhere. Given this, we 
should continue to use cost effectiveness as our guiding principle in determining which 
abatement options to pursue, allowing ourselves to be location agnostic in where those emissions 
reductions take place. Below we will outline some of the options currently available to procure 
abatement through market mechanisms. 
Offsets  
Carbon offsets refer to actions intended to compensate for the emission of carbon dioxide into 
the atmosphere. These carbon emission offsetting activities are quantified ($/MT of CO2) and 
traded. An individual or company buys the offsets and retires them (i.e. does not re-sell them), 
after which, they can claim that they have reduced their overall carbon footprint by the amount 
of retired offsets. 
Cap-and-trade permits 
Cap-and-trade permits are created by cap-and-trade systems, which are designed to cap 
emissions across carbon intensive industries in a region and allow for market based mechanisms 
to find the least cost abatement among the participating firms. Each permit represent one metric 
ton of carbon dioxide that a firm can procure, either through auction or by trading with another 
firm, that allows them to emit one additional metric ton of CO2 from their electricity generating 
or industrial process. In order to be able to use the permits to emit more carbon dioxide, the firm 
needs to retire the permit, meaning that they can no longer trade it. 
Renewable Energy Credits & Power Purchase Agreements 
Renewable energy credits (REC) work in a similar way to offsets, but are specific to projects that 
generate electricity. RECs ($/MWh) are used by large-scale utilities to comply with renewable 
portfolio standards, set by state governments whereby utilities have to ensure that a proportion of 
their energy generation is coming from renewable sources. Generally speaking, the transfer of 
RECs from the renewable energy developer to the utility will be agreed upon in the Power 
Purchase Agreement (PPA) the two parties sign as a means of proving that the energy procured 
in the contract is renewable. RECs can also be procured in REC market places, should utilities or 
any other entity be interested in claiming that a further proportion of their energy consumption is 
from renewable sources. 
Additionality 
For carbon offsets and RECs, the biggest unknown is the question of additionality. In the context 
of carbon abatement, additionality asks if the act of buying that offset or REC actually creates 
additional abatement that wouldn’t have occurred in the case of not buying that offset. This is an 
important question and one that should be addressed when buying offsets as the goal of carbon 
abatement is to reduce the quantity of carbon in the atmosphere relative to the counterfactual. To 
address this concern, organizations like Verra, Gold Standard, and the UN FCCC have developed 
mechanisms to verify and certify emissions reductions that occur from different projects, after 
which, those offsets carry with them a standard to ensure the credibility of their emissions 
reduction. Currently there are a number of markets and brokers that sell offsets varying across 
project type as well as standard (a list of offsets and prices can be found in Appendix B). 
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The question of additionality is not a concern when it comes to cap-and-trade permits, as buying 
and retiring a permit directly leads to one fewer ton of emissions that participants in that 
marketplace can emit (a list of cap-and-trade prices can be found in Appendix B). 
 
Paramount among the benefits that offsets, permits, and RECs provide is the flexibility they 
bring in terms of how and where that abatement is achieved. Seeing as how offsets, permits, and 
RECs commoditize abatement, emitters are no longer constrained by the emissions they 
themselves can achieve, as they can essentially achieve their abatement goals elsewhere. This 
allows organizations to reduce their overall emissions at the lowest cost, as a solar farm in 
Arizona or a tree plantation in Brazil might have a lower cost of carbon abatement than the 
organization otherwise would have. 
Examples of other universities undertaking off-campus carbon abatement 
Various universities around the US have recognized the importance of the least cost abatement 
principle and how it applies to carbon abatement. American University is the first US university 
to become carbon neutral achieving their goal in 2018, two years ahead of schedule.8 Their 
neutrality plan involves a combination of demand reduction techniques to reduce energy use, on-
campus renewable energy, as well as REC and carbon offset purchases. Stanford as well has 
secured a PPA to develop a solar farm in Southern California (300 miles from the Stanford 
campus) that would  offset 100% of their energy use and push them to 80% of their carbon offset 
by 2021.20 MIT as well is developing an off-site renewable energy project in North Carolina 
(about 600 highway miles from Boston) to further their carbon neutrality goals, helping develop 
a 60 MW solar farm that would offset 40% of their current electricity use.21 
The role of an on-campus market-based carbon abatement 
A report published in 2016 by The Institute for Policy Integrity at the New York University 
School of Law shows that, among economists, it is widely believed that putting a price on carbon 
is the most efficient route to reduce emissions to the low enough levels in the required time 
frame. It went further stating that economists disagreed with this premise that putting a price on 
carbon would hurt the economy. Instead, they were more concerned with the damage that would 
be caused by not reducing emissions and continuing with the business-as-usual trajectory, as this 
will stunt economic growth in the long-run and could lead to catastrophic economic 
consequences down the road. The two most common types of market based interventions are 
cap-and-trade and carbon taxation. In this report, we will focus on carbon taxation. 
Carbon Tax 
A carbon tax aims to price into any transacted good or service the cost imposed by the negative 
externality of carbon emissions that resulted from that good or service. By pricing in the cost of 
the externality, the tax is intended to correct an inefficient market outcome that otherwise was 
being overproduced. In the context of carbon abatement, a carbon tax places a fee on fossil fuel 
producers for every ton of carbon that enters the economy. While the cap-and-trade program 
fixes a quantity of emissions allowed in the market and lets the price vary, a carbon tax fixes the 
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price and leaves it up to individual firms to decide how much they want to emit (and abate) based 
on the tax level. 
 
The context in which a price instrument is preferred over a quantity instrument is when the price 
of the external damages is, more or less, known. This is not necessarily the case with carbon 
emissions, as estimates for the damages caused by marginal units of emissions vary widely 
depending on factors like discount rates and standing. On the benefits side of the ledger, a carbon 
tax provides price certainty for participants. In a cap-and-trade system, the cost associated with 
permits can vary from year to year depending on a number of factors, and in a manner that might 
not be predictable. This makes planning around the future price of permits especially difficult as 
the price might spike, leading to budgetary problems. A carbon tax avoids this problem as it sets 
a price schedule for emissions, and lets firms adjust to those prices. Additionally, implementing a 
carbon tax comes at a lower administrative cost than a cap-and-trade program as it doesn’t 
require any additional infrastructure to maintain and can easily be added onto existing taxes 
levied on firms.  
 
In light of the program’s low administrative burden and overall abatement potential, we 
recommend that the university seriously consider implementing a carbon tax across different 
business units on the electricity, natural gas, and steam consumption on campus. A carbon tax 
will be a necessary tool in the fight to go carbon neutral, as it will make business units think 
more creatively about their energy consumption habits. It bears noting that, while we believe that 
a carbon tax program would have the greatest impact for the university in its quest to go carbon 
neutral, no one of these options should be seen as a silver bullet as achieving carbon neutrality 
will require a blended solution between policy reform, market based instruments, and energy 
investments. 
Additional carbon tax considerations 
Carbon tax feasibility 
With talk in recent years of a putting a price on carbon, many companies like Microsoft and 
Shell have gotten ahead of the curve and placed a price on carbon internal to those companies. 
This approach has prepared them for when there is a legislated price on carbon, as they will have 
already factored the price into their procurement and development decisions. Similarly, 
universities like Yale, Swarthmore, and Duke have done the same, showing a recognition in 
academia of the importance of pricing carbon and the feasibility of a carbon tax at an institution 
comprised of units all with distinct goals and budgets.  
Can a carbon tax lower emissions 
In 2018, the Rhodium Group published a report on the energy and environmental implications of 
carbon taxation in the US where they showed that a carbon tax can be an effective tool at 
reducing carbon emissions. In their report, they modeled three different carbon taxes: $14/ton 
rising at 3% per year, $50 rising at 2% per year, and $73 rising at 1.5% per year. Each was 
modeled with a range of fairly conservative assumptions about energy prices and technology 
development during that time period. Among their results, they showed emissions reductions  
between 39 to 46% below 2005 levels by 2025 under a $50 tax level, which would put the US 
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well ahead of its pledged Paris goal of 26 to 28% by 2025.37 While none of the taxes considered 
are likely to achieve the long-term US goal of 80% emissions reductions below 2005 levels by 
2050, Rhodium has previously shown that current policy with no carbon tax in place is not 
nearly enough to even hit the 2025 goals. 
 
The study also found that the carbon tax drove large increases in renewable energy procurement. 
While business units on campus would not be able to sign their own individual PPAs with power 
producers or install their own renewable energy, an important takeaway from the study is that 
when a company felt a large enough impact of the tax, it invested in upgrades that reduced the 
tax burden. In the context of a university-wide carbon tax, this would come in the form of 
business units investing in energy efficiency upgrades and behavioral modifications. 
How to set a price for carbon 
The theory behind a carbon price is that, if the correct price is used, then the economy will 
respond with the optimal level of carbon reduction. While the term ‘optimal’ is up for debate, the 
central idea is that setting the price is the first and most important step in the whole process. 
When determining what price to set, the economic consensus is to use the social cost of carbon, 
that is, the total cost to society that would come from emitting that ton of carbon. In practice, the 
social cost of carbon is extremely difficult to determine. Estimates range from $6 a ton to $800 
and depend greatly on what discount rate is used to discount future cash flows to present-value 
terms and which damages are deemed to have standing in the calculation. 
 
But while the range for monetized damages might be wide, the reality in most carbon tax 
systems is that the price is set toward the lower end of that spectrum, ranging from as little as $1 
to $130 with over 33% of carbon tax systems below $15.47 This is mostly due to political 
resistance that ranges from opposition from fossil fuel interests, to concerns about distributional 
impacts and individuals’ willingness to pay the tax rates. That said, as more research is 
conducted around the world regarding the impacts of temperature on labor and agriculture, 
models are improving, and so is their estimate of the social cost of carbon. 
Distributional impacts of a carbon tax 
In the context of a society-wide carbon tax, one major concern is the disproportionate economic 
impacts across income distributions. Given that households in lower income brackets spend a 
larger proportion of their income on fuel, a flat tax on fuel would be regressive as it would cause 
people in low-income brackets to pay a higher proportion of their income towards the tax than 
people in high-income brackets. Historically, carbon taxes that have not addressed the problem 
of regressivity have not fared well. In early 1993, the Clinton Administration proposed a British 
Thermal Unit (BTU) tax, which would have taxed energy production in an effort to combat the 
emerging threat of climate change. However, opposition quickly grew and the bill was branded 
as anti-poor. The strong opposition caused the U.S. Congress to drop the proposed carbon tax 
from the larger economic reform package of which it was a part. More recently, the Yellow Vest 
protest in France is another example of strong public opposition to a carbon tax when that tax is 
perceived as unfairly burdening low-income populations. But the evidence of regressive carbon 
taxation policies does not mean that all carbon taxation policies will be burdened with 
inequitable distributional impacts. It depends on how the revenues are used. 
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Carbon tax revenues 
In 2014, a report from the National Surveys on Energy and Environment published a report on 
how the public views a carbon tax. Its finding was that public support for a carbon tax depends 
highly on the proposed uses of the revenues.5 Opposition was highest when the revenue use was 
left unspecified with overall support at 29%. However, support grew to 56% under a revenue-
neutral approach where revenues are rebated to households, and to 60% when the revenue was 
earmarked for research and development for renewable energy. This illustrated how carbon 
taxation policy lives or dies depending on how the revenues will be used. It also corroborates 
what is seen in the French carbon tax example, as only one quarter of the 34 billion euros that the 
policy was expected to raise were earmarked for measures to ease people away from using fossil 
fuel.50 In other words, support for the carbon tax hinges on whether or not the public feels that 
the revenues gained from the tax are going to fund tangible efforts to either reduce inequality or 
improve the transition to clean energy. 
Experience with a carbon tax at other universities 
Findings and Recommendations on a Carbon Tax Program at Yale 
In August 2014, the president of Yale University commissioned a carbon tax task force to 
determine whether a carbon tax should be introduced to Yale and, if so, what type of design that 
tax system would have. The following spring, the task force members reported that they thought 
a carbon tax was an appropriate tool to create the right incentives for decision makers to reduce 
emissions while also serving the purpose of expanding Yale’s role as a pioneering institution. 
They recommended starting with a carbon tax at the social cost of carbon, which they estimated 
at $40/ton, rising at 3% per year. The tax would initially be levied on carbon emissions strictly 
from energy use, with a recommendation of continuing with further research into expanding the 
carbon tax to other types of emissions. Additionally, they recommended that the carbon tax be 
used as a shadow price in the planning for major capital investments. 
 
In their recommendation, they examined several ways of managing the revenues from the tax: 
redistributing among units; setting individual targets for units; providing emissions information 
to each school; and setting aside a portion of funds for investment. For each scheme, they 
performed a historical simulation of the net tax/rebate for 2010-2014 for selected groupings of 
buildings. From their analysis, they found that a carbon tax at $40/ton would be large enough to 
get the attention of management, while not large enough to pose major difficulties for academic 
programs. 
 
Redistribution: In the Redistribution approach, buildings would be compared to the university 
as a whole during that year. If a building reduces its carbon emissions more than the university 
does on average, compared to its historical emissions level, then the building receives funds from 
the carbon tax pool, while the buildings that perform worse than the university average as a 
whole pay into the carbon tax pool. One downside of this scheme is the inability of participants 
to predict the number they are judged against, which could lead to inaccurate investment 
decisions. 
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Target: The Target scheme is similar to the Redistribution scheme where rebates are returned 
based on how the unit performs compared to a target. The difference is in how the target is set. 
Where the Redistribution scheme would compare units to the average emissions reduction 
throughout the university, the Target scheme would set a different target for each unit. This 
change would most likely result in either a surplus or deficit across the university as it is 
conceivable that each unit could over- or under-perform their specific target. In their analysis, 
they noted that this scheme might be unpopular as it could appear as a central tax. 
 
Investment: The Investment scheme would simply tax carbon and then return the entire refund 
at the end of the year to each unit as a lump sum, with a percentage of the refund earmarked 
specifically for energy efficiency investments. 
 
Information: Under the Information scheme, the piloted buildings receive a monthly energy 
report with a $40 per ton price signal, but with no actual financial consequences for the units. 
Takeaways from piloting different rebate schemes 
Shortly after their findings were made public, Yale’s president moved forward by conducting a 
pilot program. From December 2015 to May 2016, Yale piloted a carbon tax on 20 buildings to 
test the efficacy and feasibility of carbon pricing and different rebate schemes on their campus. 
They created four treatment groups of five buildings per group, with each group receiving a 
different rebate option as a treatment. The pilot found statistically significant reductions in 
emissions across all of the treatment groups relative to the control group, suggesting the potential 
for a carbon tax to serve as a strategy to enhance energy efficiency and conservation efforts. 
Each scheme had a lower average reduction than the control by 2.4 to 6.5 percentage points, with 
the Target and Redistribution schemes having the greatest average reduction at around 10 
percent.57 
 
Design variations: The Yale example suggests that carbon pricing scheme design matters, but 
that there are different variations that can work. There were no significant differences in 
emissions reductions among the carbon pricing schemes, but there were clear differences in their 
administrative feasibility. They also found that it may be more difficult for larger buildings to 
reduce emissions, and conversely, that it may be easier for energy intensive buildings to reduce 
emissions. 
 
Perceived fairness: Their results also showed that a carbon pricing scheme that redistributes 
funds across units is more effective when it is viewed as fair by all of the entities subject to it. In 
interviews during the pilot, they found that some units called the redistribution scheme unfair, as 
it didn’t account for the different sizes of buildings and how easy or difficult it would be to 
reduce emissions. If a scheme is perceived as disadvantaging certain participants, then it can 
prevent the university population from fully engaging and can cause political will for the 
program to dwindle. 
 
Clear information and incentives: Clear information can enhance the effectiveness of a carbon 
pricing tool. At Yale, all of the participants in the pilot found the building energy report as a 
useful tool for understanding their energy use, carbon emissions, and associated cost. More than 
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half of the units reported a high level of understanding after the six-month pilot term. That said, 
information alone was not a driving motivational force to reduce carbon emissions. 
 
Cost-effective emissions reduction: The study suggests that the reductions from the pilot came 
at a marginal abatement cost of around -$100/ MT of CO2e.15 
 
As a result of the pilot, Yale selected the revenue-neutral Redistribution scheme. To go along 
with the new carbon tax, Yale also committed to being carbon neutral by 2050. 
Further examples of carbon taxes 
Outside of Yale, a number of colleges have considered implementing a carbon tax on campus, 
including Swarthmore, Duke, and Berkeley. 
 
Swarthmore: In 2016, Swarthmore established an internal carbon tax ($40/MT of CO2) with 
four primary goals: (1) to provide a platform to educate and engage the community with carbon 
pricing solutions, (2) to incentivize reductions in their emissions, (3) to provide financing for 
projects that reduce their emissions, and (4) to build momentum for state, national, and global 
implementation of carbon pricing. The carbon tax is levied campus-wide with the revenues being 
used to support renewables, efficiency, metering, and educational projects. They also use the 
carbon tax level as a shadow price to motivate less carbon-intensive construction projects. 
 
Duke: Duke University is committed to being carbon neutral by 2024. In an effort to investigate 
how a carbon tax can help the university achieve that goal, a team of students set out to mimic 
Yale’s carbon tax task force to find out if a carbon tax was the right mechanism to achieve a 
greater level of business unit involvement in reducing emissions on campus. After interviewing 
people associated with Yale’s carbon tax program and investigating how a similar program 
would work on the Duke campus, they identified the energy billing process as a key road block 
in implementing a carbon tax on their campus. They concluded that the energy billing process 
should be simplified to allow for carbon taxes to be levied and included as a line item on energy 
bills. They are also considering a carbon tax pilot. 
 
Berkeley: Carbon taxes have also been considered for larger universities such as the University 
of California system. In their August 2017 report, the University of California’s Carbon 
Neutrality Initiative Finance and Management Task Force recognized that funding concerns 
would cut across all carbon reduction strategies. Even for programs like energy efficiency 
retrofits that have a negative marginal abatement cost, they find that those solutions often 
struggle to find funding due to their large up-front investments. One of the solutions they 
propose to these funding challenges is to implement an internal carbon tax across the campuses. 
Recognizing the financial and regulatory risk associated with greenhouse gas emissions, the 
report recommends setting up a shadow price for carbon, thereby allowing campuses to prioritize 
funding for actions that reduce carbon emissions without charging an actual carbon tax. Once the 
shadow price is operationalized, they recommend re-assessing whether or not a carbon tax would 
be necessary for individual campuses to further fund carbon reduction measures. 
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University of Michigan Context 
Energy Infrastructure 
Generation at the University of Michigan 
The University of Michigan receives steam and electricity from a variety of sources. The CPP, 
located on central campus, primarily serves steam demand, the production of which is driven by 
winter heating demand. In these cases, electricity is a bi-product of the steam production, and it 
reduces electricity demand otherwise served by the DTE grid. Steam is the binding constraint for 
electricity production by the CPP, as there needs to be demand for steam in order to produce 
electricity. In the summer, heating demand is lower, but steam can also be a source of cooling. 
However, due to the age of the steam cooling equipment, when they break down, they are 
replaced with newer, electricity driven cooling (AC units), effectively lowering the steam 
demand in the summer months, while increasing the electricity demand. With the lower steam 
demand, less electricity is able to be supplied by the CPP at the same time as more is being 
demanded by the campus, leading to a higher reliance on DTE. On North Campus, electricity 
load is served by DTE, and steam load is served by a distributed network of 60 to 70 individual 
boilers fueled by natural gas. A rough breakdown of yearly electricity demand across Central 
Campus, North Campus and the housing complexes can be seen in Table 1. 
 
   Table 1. UM yearly energy consumption breakdown by location 
UM Sustainability Reporting 
Since 2007, the Office of Campus Sustainability has been measuring and reporting on more than 
160 environmental metrics around campus in topical areas like energy use and emissions, as well 
as cross-cutting and emerging sustainability issues. The measurements are taken at the building 
level, which often doesn’t integrate smoothly with the boundaries for schools, as many units 
share building space. While the Office of Campus Sustainability creates annual reports for these 
metrics, they are measured and made available monthly.  
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Financial Infrastructure 
Energy bill administration 
Billing for utility services is administered on the school/unit level, while consumption of 
different services (energy, water, steam) is captured at the building level through meters. The 
utilities department manages metering and billing throughout campus. For buildings that house 
multiple units, energy use is allocated base on square footage assigned to the school/unit. 
Schools are charged on their electricity use ($/kWh) and steam use ($/1000 lbs.), while 
consumption of air and water are free.  
 
 
Fig. 1. U-M Utility Enterprise Rates from: “Utility Rates.” F&O Utilities, utilities.fo.umich.edu/services/energy-
utilities/business-services/utility-rates/. 
Estimating energy costs 
When the units submit their five-year budget plan, they also estimate their five-year utility cost, 
and the Provost’s Office takes that estimated amount out of their budget and gives it to the utility 
department. At end of the fiscal year, each unit receives an adjustment (positive or negative) for 
the difference between estimated and actual costs. This is based on the price of electricity and the 
quantity of over/under consumption, but schools don’t see the prices and quantities they are 
being taxed/credited for in that adjustment. 
Administrative feasibility of a carbon tax at UM 
This robust data collection process of sustainability metrics conducted by the Office of Campus 
Sustainability adds to the feasibility of implementing a carbon tax, as the university has the 
capacity to measure how much energy buildings, and even units inside buildings, consume. This 
goes a long way towards ensuring that a tax on carbon emissions could be levied with a 
relatively high level of accuracy. 
 
An administrative hurdle in implementing a carbon tax is the lack of administrative infrastructure 
around reporting out energy usage in a reasonable time frame. Currently, the Provost Office of 
Budget and Planning only reports out on consumption data on a yearly basis. Monthly reporting 
would remedy this, as building managers would be able to draw links between what actions in 
the previous month drove spikes or dips in energy consumption to occur, and then be able to able 
to make adjustments that improve energy efficiency. At present, monthly data is available online, 
but building/energy managers would have to take the initiative each month to look up that 
monthly data. 
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Difficulty of carbon tax with large campuses 
Many of the universities referenced in this report as having implemented a carbon tax are 
different from the University of Michigan in one key attribute, their size. Yale and Duke, both of 
which have piloted a carbon tax program, have 12,000 and 16,000 students respectively, while 
the University of Michigan has roughly three times as many students (45,000) and more than 
double the carbon footprint.1, 2, 3, 10, 16, 26 This difference is not inconsequential when it comes to 
evaluating the merits and feasibility of a campus-wide carbon tax. Timothy Gutowski, a 
professor of Mechanical Engineering at MIT, writes that carbon taxes on larger universities are a 
more difficult task, as engineering and science laboratories cause a wider variance in the energy 
intensity of research activities. What he dubs “industrial-strength” universities are four times 
more carbon intensive per student than the baccalaureate colleges (28 tons/student compared to 7 
tons/student), and they have much higher numbers of students, faculty, and staff.27 Other issues 
might arise with the UM Hospital System, as it is a large consumer of electricity, but may not 
have the flexibility that other units do to reduce its demand. 
Proposed actions 
Central Power Plant Upgrade 
In March of 2017, the Board of Regents approved an $80 million expansion to the CPP, which 
would include the addition of a 15 MW natural gas turbine to the plant. When it comes online in 
2020, the university estimates that the upgrade will reduce the greenhouse gas emissions by 
80,000 metric tons per year, but the plant upgrade wasn’t decided upon solely for the 
environmental benefits. Based on the university’s estimates, the upgrade is expected to payback 
within the first decade of its estimated three decade lifetime, making it a prudent financial 
investment regardless of the environmental benefits. 
Renewable Power Purchase Agreement with DTE 
The CPP produces around 200 million kWh for central campus each year. With the new plant 
upgrade, the CPP’s generation will increase by 50% to 300 million kWh and the university 
estimates it will leave just 110,000 MT of emissions reductions to reach our 2025 target of 25% 
reduction. To meet this shortfall, the university will sign a renewable energy PPA with DTE. 
 
To procure the remaining 450 million kWh of the university's yearly electricity demand that is 
not provided by the CPP, UM buys power in bulk from DTE through a separate PPA. Currently, 
the university buys electricity from DTE for around 7.33 cents/kWh as part of that PPA locking 
them into this rate until the end of 2024.55 Once that contract has ended, UM has the option to 
purchase part, or all, of their remaining electricity demand from one of DTE’s Voluntary Green 
Pricing Programs, called MI Green Power. The program sources wind and solar energy projects 
in Michigan, and allows subscribers to pay a premium between .5 and 3.3 cents per kWh to claim 
that the energy they consume comes from one of these projects. Notably, while the university 
will procure 200 million kWh from the MI Green Power program to reach the 25% emissions 
reduction target, further procurement of renewable energy from DTE past 200 kWh shouldn’t be 
seen as a solution to get much further with emissions reductions. Even if the university were to 
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purchase all of their 450 million kWh of demand from DTE as renewables, that would only reach 
a 35% reduction in emissions relative to 2006 levels. 
Passive gains from Michigan Renewable Portfolio Standard 
Michigan’s current Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) of 15% by 2021 ranks towards the low 
end when compared to other states with RPS targets.52 However after coming under pressure 
from billionaire environmentalist Tom Steyer to reduce their carbon intensity, Consumers 
Energy and DTE agreed to increase their renewable capacity to 25% by 2030.15 DTE went 
further to explain in their 2018 Renewable Energy Plan that they plan to double their renewable 
capacity by 2022 from 1 to 2 GW. DTE’s stated goal in all this is to steadily reduce carbon 
emissions over the next three decades (50% reduction by 2030 and 80% by 2040), primarily 
achieved by shutting down coal plants and replacing them with gas-fired plants.24 Additional 
pressure may come from the state government as newly-elected governor Gretchen Whitmer has 
been on record supporting 100% renewable energy by 2050.44 It remains to be seen whether or 
not emissions reductions from the power sector in Michigan will proceed as planned. The 
relative cost of renewables appears to be easing the challenge. As the Michigan Public Service 
Commission reported in 2018, the cost of renewables is falling much faster than regulators 
anticipated, and renewables are closing in on cost-parity with natural gas.7 
Historical and forecasted emissions 
A forecast of UM’s emissions trajectory through 2030 can be seen in Figure 2. With the CPP 
upgrade coming online in 2020, and the renewable energy PPA with DTE starting in 2025, the 
university is expecting to hit their 2025 reduction goal of 25% below 2006 levels. However, if 
the university is to consider the emissions impact of methane leakage that occurs from wellhead 
to power plant, an additional and unaccounted for 7,000 MT of CO2e, will be emitted each year, 
meaning that we will miss our 2025 target by that same amount. 
 
Fig. 2. UM Current emissions trajectory and 2025 emissions reduction goal 
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Analysis 
Modeling a Carbon Tax with Rebate Schemes  
Methodology 
A carbon tax is one of the most important tools available to the university to help align 
individual schools’ incentives with the university-wide goal of carbon neutrality. In light of this, 
the first part of our analysis is geared towards estimating and analyzing the effects of a carbon 
tax on campus. The purpose is not to analyze the behavioral responses of a tax, but rather to see 
the tax revenues and rebate levels under various tax schemes. To do this, we performed a 
historical analysis of the budgetary impacts a carbon tax would have on individual schools. In 
our model, we set 2014 as the base year upon which all of the reduction goals would be based off 
of, and then administered the hypothesized tax from 2015 through 2017. When selecting schools 
to include in the case study, we varied our selection across the size of their budget, their quantity 
of emissions, which campus fund they belong to, and number of buildings they have. The 
building level emissions data for the analysis are collected by the Office of Campus 
Sustainability, and the budgetary data is gathered from the Regent-approved University of 
Michigan campus budget forecast for 2017. Due to the fact that some buildings are shared across 
departments, we allotted the emissions from buildings to departments based on the Net 
Assignable Square Footage (NASF) assigned from that building to a given school. The list of 
schools can be seen in Table 2 along with their 2017 budget forecasts and modeled carbon 
emissions for 2017. For further detail on the modeling of the carbon tax, see Appendix C. 
Modeling a Carbon Tax 
The first component of our analysis assessed the impact a carbon tax would have on the budgets 
of the different schools in the study. We estimated the dollar amounts paid to the carbon tax each 
year and what that tax represented as a percentage of the school’s budget. The estimates were 
made at two tax levels, $40 and $100 per metric ton of CO2. Results can be seen in Table 2. 
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Table 2. Estimated carbon tax expenditure for various UM business units (2017) 
 
Table 2 shows that the range of amounts paid to a carbon tax and the percentage of a school’s 
overall budget vary greatly across schools. In the $100 per metric ton scenario, some units pay 
around 3 to 5% of their overall budget to the carbon tax, while others are close to 1%. While the 
table only shows data for 2017, the proportion of the overall budget for 2015 and 2016 show 
similar results. It is also worth pointing out that the two schools representing physical sciences, 
Engineering and Chemistry, saw two of the three highest overall carbon taxes as a percentage of 
their budget. 
Redistribution and Target rebate schemes 
The second component of our analysis focused on rebate schemes and their impact across the 
university. While rebate schemes are not the only means of using the collected tax revenue, they 
are a great way to incentivize schools to buy-in to a carbon tax program, and we were interested 
in understanding how a redistribution and a target scheme would differ in terms of their net tax 
levied on business units. The redistribution scheme is a revenue neutral approach that compares 
each school’s percentage change in emissions to the overall university-wide emissions 
percentage change. Schools outperforming the university average are rebated more than they 
were taxed, resulting in a net rebate, and schools underperforming are rebated less, resulting in a 
net tax. In essence, the net tax from the schools that underperform are redistributed to the schools 
that overperform. The target scheme involves comparing units against individualized targets set 
for each school, instead of comparing them to the university average. Due to the fact that 
different targets can be set for different schools, this scheme is not revenue neutral, and will 
often result in a net tax or net rebate across the university. For our case study, we didn’t vary the 
targets across units, instead opting to increase the target reduction for each school by 2% each 
year. Additionally, the net taxes were calculated as if the carbon tax had been set to $40 per 
metric ton of CO2. Results from this analysis can be seen in Table 3. 
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Table 3. Comparison of net charge and revenue raised between a redistribution and target scheme 
 
Table 3 illustrates the aggregate tax (2015-2017) for the eight schools across the two different 
schemes. For each school, the net tax decreased significantly from the redistribution to the target 
scheme. This is due to the fact that the target set in the first year by the university average was a 
much steeper drop (4.3%) between years than any other step across either scheme. Because of 
this drop, the College of Engineering would have had to pay $50,000 more in the first year of the 
redistribution scheme than they would have under the target scheme for the same year. Likewise, 
the Student Life department would have moved from a net rebate of $4,000 to a net tax of 
$43,000. This underscores one of the downsides to the redistribution scheme, the uncertainty in 
where the target will be year to year. This uncertainty around the targeted reductions for each 
school could lead to economic uncertainty for those schools, as they will have a more difficult 
time forecasting their expected net tax or rebate. The bottom section, Revenue Raised, bears out 
how the redistribution scheme is revenue neutral, as there is zero revenue raised, while the target 
scheme results in a net gain for the university. Overall, rebate schemes are a good way to 
incentivize buy-in to a carbon tax program on the part of business units, but which rebate scheme 
will be most successful depends greatly on the perception of how fair and transparent the chosen 
scheme is perceived to be. 
Alternative uses for tax revenue 
The schemes modeled above are one way of using the tax revenue, but there are other ways to 
use the revenue and maintain the incentive to reduce emissions that do not involve rebating the 
funds back to the schools. One option is to bank the tax revenue year over year, and earmarking 
it specifically to fund energy efficiency or clean energy investments that are otherwise not 
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undertaken due to being too capital intensive. In this way, the tax revenue is used to fund 
projects that would benefit multiple schools, but are cost prohibitive for any one school to fund 
on their own. Alternatively, the tax revenue could be used to offset existing taxes at the 
university, namely the Provost’s tax. The Provost’s tax arguably is distortionary, so reducing its 
impact on campus may be desirable. 
Recommendation - Begin carbon tax pilot 
The university should begin piloting a carbon tax to subsets of the business units on campus. 
Across the subsets, they should experiment with different rebate/information schemes to 
determine which are most effective at encouraging units to reduce their energy consumption. 
Given that some units are more energy intensive than others or have more inflexible demand, the 
issue of carbon taxation might be a politically delicate issue. In light of this, the university should 
solicit feedback from the participating units to better understand their attitudes towards a carbon 
tax, what rebate/revenue schemes are preferred and viewed as fair, and what level units feel the 
tax should be set to. Overall, the benefits that a carbon tax brings in aligning emissions reduction 
incentives throughout the university vastly outweighs any costs that might result, and the 
university should not waste any time before beginning implementation. 
Comparing Average Costs of Abatement 
Methodology 
As stated previously in this report, we recommend incorporating marginal or average cost of 
abatement into the means of determining which abatement options the university should pursue. 
In this section of our analysis, we aim to shed light on the relative costs of different abatement 
mechanisms through their average cost of abatement, as well as their abatement potential 
throughout the lifetime of each given option. For more information on the estimation of average 
abatement cost and abatement potential for the CPP upgrade and the PPA, see Appendix D. 
Average abatement cost of the Central Power Plant upgrade 
The university states that the CPP upgrade will reduce the university’s greenhouse gas emissions 
by 80,000 per year. The means through which the university can claim abatement while burning 
natural gas comes from the fact that the university will no longer be procuring as much 
electricity from the DTE grid, which is more carbon intensive per kilowatt-hour than natural gas. 
However, to understand the sum total of emissions reductions that the plant would account for, 
we need to look at the grid intensity across the 30-year expected lifetime of the CPP. To do this, 
we gathered estimates for the carbon intensity of DTE’s portfolio for 2020 to 2030 from DTE, 
and then extrapolated what the carbon intensity would be from 2030 to 2040 and 2040 to 2050 
based on DTE’s carbon intensity reduction goals for those decades (50% carbon reduction 2030, 
80% carbon reduction by 2040, and an extrapolated 85% reduction by 2050). We calculated the 
net emissions factor (lbs./MWh) that would result from burning natural gas instead of using the 
grid. We then estimated the yearly reductions that using the CPP would accrue as a substitute for 
using the electrical grid. For this step in the analysis, we assumed that the CPP would generate 
167,943 MWh of electricity each year. This number was extrapolated by taking UM’s reduction 
goals for the CPP for 2020 (80,000 MT), converting it to lbs., and dividing it by the current 
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emissions factor of the grid (lbs./MWh). The final component in this analysis was to include the 
leaked natural methane gas that occurs throughout the supply chain. At a 2.3% leakage rate, we 
found that the university was responsible for an additional 7,000 metric tons of CO2e per year as 
a result of the CPP upgrade. With that, we were able to estimate what the total emissions 
reductions would be from the lifetime of the CPP upgrade. 
 
In order to get the average cost of abatement, we then estimated the total costs of the upgrade. In 
short, we took the fixed cost of the upgrade, added in the discounted variable costs, and 
subtracted the discounted avoided cost of procuring that quantity of electricity from the utility. 
Given the cost of per unit of electricity and the low cost of natural gas, on net, the power plant 
upgrade has a negative cost over the 30 year lifetime of around -117 million dollars. In other 
words, the CPP upgrade may be a financially sensible investment regardless of its CO2 
abatement potential.  
Assumptions 
It should be noted that there were various assumptions that we made in our analysis that we were 
unable to confirm with anyone in the utilities department at the university. Broadly, the 
assumptions we made centered around operation and maintenance, fuel and utility costs, as well 
as expected lifetime and discount rate. The list of assumptions can be found in Appendix E. 
Should any of these assumptions change, it is reasonable to expect that our results would change 
as well. 
Average abatement cost of the renewable Power Purchase Agreement with DTE 
Similar to how we estimated the average abatement cost of the CPP upgrade, we estimated the 
average abatement cost for the renewable PPA that the university is considering with DTE. Any 
emissions reductions that the renewable PPA would take credit for would be determined by the 
carbon intensity of the counterfactual to signing the PPA, which would involve procuring 
electricity from DTE. Given that the carbon intensity of the grid is expected to decrease over the 
lifetime of the PPA, the emissions reductions from the PPA in each successive year are fewer 
and fewer. For this analysis, we estimated the carbon intensity of the grid in the same manner as 
for the CPP upgrade. We also estimated that the university would procure around 216,000 MWh 
per year from the PPA, given that is how much electricity the university would need to procure 
in 2025 in order to meet their 2025 emissions reduction goal. With this, we calculated the yearly 
reductions in carbon emissions due to the PPA from 2025 to 2050. Finally, we estimated the 
abatement cost at different premium levels from the retail rate, a .5 cent premium, a 1 cent 
premium, and a 3.3 cent premium. Similar to the above analysis, we used a 3.5% discount rate to 
discount the future abatement costs to net present value. 
Results 
Figure 3 illustrates the emissions reductions from the CPP upgrade and the renewable PPA over 
time. From 2020 to 2050, the difference in carbon intensity between the DTE grid and 
combusted natural methane gas (labeled as Net Emissions Factor) is expected to decrease, and as 
such, the emissions reductions from the CPP upgrade and the renewable PPA will decrease as 
well. In 2025, the renewable PPA is expected to offset 110,000 MT of CO2 which is reduced to 
just 25,000 MT of CO2 in 2050. Similarly, accounting for natural methane gas leakage and the 
28 
reduced carbon intensity of the grid, the CPP upgrade would only abate around 15,000 MT of 
CO2 per year over a 30-year lifetime, less than 20% of what the university originally estimated 
would be the per year abatement (80,000 MT of CO2). While, the upgrade will result in 73,000 
MT of CO2 abatement in 2020, by 2039, the CPP will be more carbon intensive than the DTE 
grid. By 2050, operating the CPP instead of procuring that electricity from DTE will result in 
over 12,000 MT of additional CO2 emissions per year. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Emissions reductions over 50 years from the CPP upgrade and PPA 
Table 4 highlights the average cost of abatement for the CPP upgrade, the renewable PPA at 
different premium levels, buying permits from the RGGI and California cap-and-trade markets, 
as well as buying carbon offsets from the California Offset market. While these numbers are 
approximate, they clearly show that the CPP upgrade is the most cost effective means of 
reducing emissions, largely due to the fact that the upgrade has a positive NPV prior to factoring 
in any benefits from carbon emissions reduction. The other main takeaway is just how much the 
cost of abatement varies within the PPA depending on how much the university would end up 
paying as a premium on top of what they otherwise would be paying for electricity. Even at just 
a half cent premium, the university would be paying almost twice as much per metric ton of 
abatement compared to buying and retiring permits on the RGGI market. Similarly, at a 1 cent 
premium, the PPA is almost 50% more expensive per unit as the California cap-and-trade and 
offset markets. 
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Table 4. Average cost and potential across abatement options 
Recommendation - Delay further technology investments 
Figures 4 and 5 show how, over the past decade, costs of utility-scale solar and onshore wind 
have dramatically decreased at the same time as deployments have increased. The National 
Renewable Energy Laboratory predicts that utility-scale solar costs will decline an additional 60-
80% by 2050 with onshore wind prices declining by 30-64% in the same time frame.6 With 
prices expected to decrease for the foreseeable future, it might not make sense for the university 
to begin building or purchasing power from renewable projects now, as it will lock them into a 
price that will seem high in just a few years’ time. Instead, the university should delay large 
investment decisions until we are further down on the cost curve with those technologies, all 
while buying time with carbon offsets and cap-and-trade permits. Similarly, with a new 
administration coming into power in the state of Michigan that has ambitions climate goals, we 
might see Michigan’s grid decarbonize at a faster rate than DTE otherwise predicts. In that case, 
it would benefit the university to push the renewable PPA and CPP upgrade investment decisions 
further out, as their overall abatement potential might decrease and cost per unit of abatement 
might increase faster than we are predicting. But pushing renewable energy projects or PPA 
decisions out into the future does not change the imperative to be carbon neutral now and 
therefore, procuring cap-and-trade permits and carbon offsets, at what is already a low price, 
makes sense as a carbon management technique for the coming decade.  
 
Fig. 4. U.S. onshore wind deployment & cost 
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Fig. 5. U.S. utility-scale solar PV deployment & cost 
Carbon Neutral by 2020 
Methodology 
Given the dire warning set out by the 2018 UN IPCC report showing that society has 
approximately 12 years to dramatically reduce carbon emissions to avoid climate disaster, we 
assess a few options for the university to go carbon neutral on an expedited time frame. The final 
section of our analysis looks at feasible options for the university to achieve carbon neutrality by 
2020 and what the financial cost of each option would be. For the purposes of this analysis, we 
reduced the time frame under which we estimate the cost of going carbon neutral to between 
2020 and 2029. In this 10-year period under the university’s planned trajectory, we estimate that 
the university will have a net carbon footprint of 6 million metric tons that would need to be 
reduced to zero to be carbon neutral.  
 
Given the short time frame between when this report will come out and when 2020 begins, the 
range of feasible abatement options to get the university to carbon neutrality is limited to cap-
and-trade permits and carbon offsets, as neither of these options requires implementation or 
construction time that would otherwise delay the offsetting of carbon emissions. For each of the 
three options that we modeled; RGGI cap-and-trade permits; California cap-and-trade permits; 
and California carbon offsets; we estimated future costs by assuming an annual rate of price 
increase of 1.4%, and then discounted future costs back to net present value at a 3.5% discount 
rate.  
Cost Comparison 
Figure 6 shows the total cost of procuring all 6 million metric tons from these separate markets 
over the 10-year time frame (details in Appendix F & G). Given the low cost of RGGI cap-and-
trade permits relative to the California markets, the total RGGI permit expenditure is much 
smaller than that of the California markets totaling around $30 million for the decade. But even 
with the higher cost in the California markets, they are still appealing relative to other abatement 
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options. For reference, buying into the California cap-and-trade market to go carbon neutral from 
2020-2029 would cost around $80 million, the same price as the initial fixed cost of the CPP 
upgrade in the same year. However, spending that $80 million in the California cap-and-trade 
market would amount to 6 million MT of CO2 abatement relative to 500 thousand MT of CO2 
abatement in the case of the CPP upgrade for that same decade. 
 
 
Fig. 6. Average annual cost for going carbon neutral from 2020 - 2029 
Emissions Trajectory 
The last part of our analysis around carbon neutrality was to visualize how the emissions 
trajectory for the university would change moving from our current emissions trajectory to one 
of carbon neutrality by 2020. Figure 7 illustrates these two trajectories side by side with the 
current emissions trajectory in orange, and the carbon neutral by 2020 emissions trajectory in 
blue, as well as a dashed line showing the 25% emissions reduction goal set for 2025. In the 
current emissions trajectory, we assume that the CPP upgrade comes online in 2020, and that the 
university enters into a PPA with DTE for approximately 216,365 MWh per year that begins in 
2025. What the graph immediately illustrates is the stark difference between the two lines, and 
the area between the orange and the blue, which represents the 6 million tons of carbon that 
would be abated if the university went carbon neutral in 2020.  
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Fig. 7. UM Current emissions trajectory, 2025 emissions reduction goal, and carbon neutral by 2020 trajectory 
Recommendation - Set an ambitious carbon neutrality target 
The striking nature of the graph illustrates the upside of achieving carbon neutrality by 2020; not 
only will we abate 6 million more metric tons in the next decade than we otherwise would, but 
we would make a statement among large research universities showing that carbon neutrality is 
possible on short timeframes. What is less evident by the graph are the downsides to this 
approach. Primarily, the university would be spending resources without investing in technology 
and infrastructure improvements that would either provide clean energy to the university or 
reduce its overall demand. In that case and beyond the 2020-2029 timeframe, cap-and-trade 
permits or carbon offsets can be seen not as a long-term solution, but as a means of closing the 
emissions gap to carbon neutrality, while also buying the university time before investing in 
technological solutions. 
 
Given the sense of urgency summed up by the UN IPCC, we argue that the 2050 target set by 
many countries and organizations as a target to achieve carbon neutrality is not ambitious 
enough. If the University of Michigan truly wants to put itself on a path to carbon neutrality that 
will have a substantial impact on climate change, it should commit to be carbon neutral by 2020. 
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Appendices 
 
APPENDIX A 
 
 
 
These charts show UM campus-wide energy consumption and quantity of purchased electricity since 2006. Further 
detail on the formulation of these charts and other sustainability metrics can be found in 
“Rego_Benjamin_Supplementary_File1.xlsx” 
 
Data for this analysis was gathered from the following sources: 
- “Sustainability Report.” Planet Blue, 29 May 2018, sustainability.umich.edu/ocs/reports. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
 
 
These tables show the prices of different offsets and emissions trading schemes. Carbon offsets are broken down by 
project type and standard. Emissions trading is broken down by initiative. Further detail can be found in 
“Rego_Benjamin_Supplementary_File2.xlsx” 
Data for this analysis was gathered from the following sources: 
- Hamrick, K., & Gallant, M. (2017). Unlocking potential: State of the voluntary carbon markets 2017. 
Washington, DC: Ecosystem Marketplace, Forest Trends. 
- “Map & Data.” Carbon Pricing Dashboard | Up-to-Date Overview of Carbon Pricing Initiatives, 
carbonpricingdashboard.worldbank.org/map_data. 
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APPENDIX C 
 
 
 
 
These tables show how the individual net charges were calculated for the different business units in the carbon tax 
case study for both the Redistribution and Target Schemes. Further detail on the formulas used in the calculations 
can be found in “Rego_Benjamin_Supplementary_File3.xlsx” 
 
Data for this analysis was gathered from the following sources: 
- 2016-2017 Budget Detail. The University of Michigan, June 2016. 
- Kunselman, Steve & Ken Keeler. Personal interview. 21 Aug. 2018. 
- “Sustainability Report.” Planet Blue, 29 May 2018, sustainability.umich.edu/ocs/reports. 
- UnivRecord. “Michigan Athletics Reflects Solid Finances in Budget.” The University Record, 
record.umich.edu/articles/michigan-athletics-reflects-solid-finances-fy-18-budget. 
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APPENDIX D 
Table 1 
 
Table 2 
 
 
These tables illustrate how the declining carbon intensity of the grid impact the average abatement cost and 
abatement potential of the CPP upgrade (Table 1) and the PPA (Table 2). Further detail on the formulas used in the 
calculations can be found in “Rego_Benjamin_Supplementary_File4.xlsx” 
Data for this analysis was gathered from the following sources: 
- Adams, James & Malcolm Bambling. Personal interview. 18 Dec. 2018. 
- The PPA Task Force. An Investigation of Power Purchase Agreements for the University of Michigan: A 
Path to Carbon Neutrality. Students for Clean Energy, 2018, energy.umich.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2018/06/ppas_for_u-m_final_report_0.pdf. 
- “U.S. Energy Information Administration - EIA - Independent Statistics and Analysis.” Today in Energy - 
Daily Prices - Prices - U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), 
www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/prices.php. 
- Voluntary Green Pricing Programs University of Michigan. DTE Energy, 14 Sept. 2018. 
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APPENDIX E 
 
 
This table lists the assumptions used in the CPP upgrade and PPA analysis.  
 
Data for the assumptions was gathered from the following sources: 
- Adams, James & Malcolm Bambling. Personal interview. 18 Dec. 2018. 
- The PPA Task Force. An Investigation of Power Purchase Agreements for the University of Michigan: A 
Path to Carbon Neutrality. Students for Clean Energy, 2018, energy.umich.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2018/06/ppas_for_u-m_final_report_0.pdf. 
- “U.S. Energy Information Administration - EIA - Independent Statistics and Analysis.” Today in Energy - 
Daily Prices - Prices - U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), 
www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/prices.php. 
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APPENDIX F 
 
 
Tables representing past cap-and-trade permit prices, and estimates for future prices. Further detail on the formulas 
used in the calculations can be found in “Rego_Benjamin_Supplementary_File4.xlsx” 
 
Data for these graphs was gathered from the following sources: 
- “Allowance Prices and Volumes.” Allowance Prices and Volumes | RGGI, Inc., 
www.rggi.org/auctions/auction-results/prices-volumes. 
- “California Carbon Dashboard.” California Carbon Dashboard: Carbon Prices, the Latest News, and 
California Policy, calcarbondash.org/. 
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Graphs and tables showing the cost per year over the next decade of going carbon neutral. The six graphs show how 
cost differs depending on what market you buy the offsets/cap-and-trade permits, and whether or not the university 
signs the PPA. These graphs and tables can be found in “Rego_Benjamin_Supplementary_File4.xlsx” 
 
 Data for these tables and graphs was gathered from the following sources: 
- “Allowance Prices and Volumes.” Allowance Prices and Volumes | RGGI, Inc., 
www.rggi.org/auctions/auction-results/prices-volumes. 
- “California Carbon Dashboard.” California Carbon Dashboard: Carbon Prices, the Latest News, and 
California Policy, calcarbondash.org/. 
 
  
 
